<text id=00he1900><title>To Fly and To Fight: Introduction</title>
<history>US Air Force: Events History</history>
<article><hdr>To Fly and To Fight: Introduction</hdr><body>
<p>"The mission of the Air Force is to fly and to fight—and don't you forget it!"
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<p>That sentiment, on posters that hang in every fighter squadron briefing or ready room, is a cornerstone of the fighter pilots' creed. It was disappointing to go to war in Southeast Asia and to find that only half the mission was available. The early months of the conflict were characterized by a nearly complete lack of classical air combat. The big fighter sweeps of World War II and the Korean War seemed to be things of the distant past, as ancient now as shooting down observation balloons on the Western Front.
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<p>The combat forces were fighter-bombers, a mix most often of F-4s and F-105s, all carrying bombs. There were not enough fighters available in the theater to use any of them as dedicated escorts to beat off MiG attacks.
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<p>The North Vietnamese air force (NVAF) was small and poorly equipped. However, they could not be ignored; their MiGs were a constant threat to strike forces headed north, and they could be deadly opponents in a swirling dogfight where their high maneuverability gave them the turning advantage.
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<p>Their interception tactics were simple. The NVAF radar system gave ample warning time, and the MiGs scrambled and orbited, either high or low, waiting for the strike force to show. Then they would make a high-speed pass at the formation, hoping that the threat of attack would force the fighters to jettison their bombs to prepare for combat.
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<p>The primary reason for the lack of fighters was an unusual one. Southeast Asia was a small theater of war, and the distances from strike force bases to Hanoi were relatively short. From Udorn to Hanoi was 325 miles (523 km); from Takhli, 550 miles (885 km). These distances were well within the limits of the official performance data for the combat radius of both the F-4 and the F-105. Under wartime conditions, with external weapons multiplying the drag and afterburner operations multiplying the fuel flow, those performance figures were reduced drastically. The strike force had to have aerial refueling to hit targets as close as 350 miles (560 km) away.
